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ABSTRACT 
In 2002, Argentina implemented a large-scale public employment program to deal with 
the latest economic crisis and the ensuing massive unemployment and poverty. The 
program, known as Plan Jefes, offered part-time work for unemployed heads of 
households, and yet more than 70 percent of the people who turned up for work were 
women. The present paper evaluates the operation of this program, its macroeconomic 
effects, and its impact on program participants. We report findings from our 2005 
meetings with policymakers and visits to different project sites. We find that Jefes 
addresses many important community problems, is well received by participants, and 
serves the needs of women particularly well. Some of the benefits women report are 
working in mother-friendly jobs, getting needed training and education, helping the 
community, and finding dignity and empowerment through work.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
For many years, Argentina was proclaimed to be the success story of IMF austerity and 
market liberalization policies, until it experienced an economic meltdown in the winter of 
2001–2002. To deal with the looming crisis and skyrocketing unemployment and poverty 
rates, the Argentinean government implemented a limited job guarantee program called 
Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados (Program for the Unemployed Male and 
Female Heads of Households, or simply Jefes). Participation in the program grew 
quickly, to two million workers at its peak—about 5% of the population and about 13% 
of the labor force. Much to the surprise of Labor Ministry officials, female heads of 
households had initially accounted for 64% of program participants and that had grown to 
a bit less than three-quarters by 2005. Formal surveys indicate that the program is well 
targeted to intended households (poor families with children) and is highly popular 
among participants. Studies by international researchers (including the World Bank) find 
that projects are generally well run, completed on time, and provide needed services to 
poor communities (see World Bank Reports No. 23710 and No. 32463).  
However, the program faces sustained criticism in the media, by some research 
institutions, and by policy makers. Indeed, even economists at the Labor Ministry have 
undertaken a replacement of Jefes with a more traditional combination of unemployment 
compensation for the “economically active” (largely male) population and “welfare” for 
women (who are considered to be largely “inactive”). In August 2005, research scholars 
at the Center for Full Employment and Price Stability at the University of Missouri-
Kansas City (C-FEPS) conducted a series of interviews with government officials, project 
coordinators, and program participants. In this paper we will report on our evaluation of 
the benefits of the program—particularly for female participants, as Jefes participation 
has from the beginning been predominately female.  
This is important because those who have contemplated program “reform” do not 
appear to recognize the extent to which gender matters in Jefes program evaluation. 
Indeed, the primary measures used by officials to evaluate the program (“market 
efficiency” criteria) ignore many, and perhaps most, of the benefits received by women. 
We find that female participants prefer work over welfare because they feel that working   3
has enriched their social life, allowing them to become involved in, and contribute to, 
their communities. Further, employment in some of the projects has also increased access 
to a range of social services that (anecdotally) help to reduce spousal abuse, school drop-
out rates, drug abuse and related crimes, and so on. Most of the women—especially those 
who had not previously participated in formal labor markets—believe they are learning 
useful skills; many think they are improving their chances of obtaining other (non-Jefes) 
paid work, which some women desire. At the time of this writing, women were moving 
in large numbers from Jefes to Familias, a welfare program which provides income to 
poor mothers depending on the number of children they have, without the simultaneous 
provision of employment. We conclude that government attempts to dismantle the Jefes 
plan, and specifically the aggressive encouragement to transfer women from public 
employment to welfare, represents a huge step backward with respect to reduction of 
gender inequality. We conclude with a call for more detailed and larger studies of the 
gendered impacts of Jefes, and of the possible consequences of “reform” along traditional 
lines for women who are being dismissed from the program. 
 
II. OVERVIEW OF JEFES PROGRAM AND EVALUATION OF AGGREGATE 
DATA  
 
Through most of the 1990s, Argentina had been the poster child for the Washington 
Consensus, adopting a currency board, opening markets, downsizing government, and 
freeing capital. After its economy collapsed and unemployment and poverty skyrocketed, 
it implemented a limited employer of last resort program called Plan Jefes de Hogar to 
provide jobs to poor heads of households.  
The Jefes program provides a payment of 150 pesos per month to a head of 
household for a minimum of four hours of work daily. Participants work in community 
services and small construction or maintenance activities, or are directed to training 
programs (including finishing basic education). The household must contain children 
under age 18, persons with handicaps, or a pregnant woman. Households are generally 
limited to one participant in the Jefes program. The program was intended to be one of 
the government’s primary programs to deal with the economic crisis that gripped   4
Argentina with the collapse of the currency board. Most other safety net programs were 
eliminated or reduced in order to shift funding to Jefes. The Ministry of Labor also 
operates another employment program, Programa de Emergencia Laboral (PEL) with a 
design very similar to that of Jefes—monthly benefits are the same, but it includes some 
beneficiaries that do not qualify for Jefes.  
The government’s total spending on Jefes and PEL peaked at 1% of GDP in the 
early stages of implementation, with nearly two million participants (about 1.6 million in 
Jefes and 300,000 in PEL) in May 2003. This is out of a population of only 37 million, or 
more than 5% of the population. The size of the program was a concern, not only because 
of organizational demands, but also because of the cost. However, it should be noted that 
the United States spends 1% of GDP on anti-poverty social assistance, while France and 
the UK spend 3–4% of GDP on such programs (Neubourg, Castonguay, and Roelen 
2005). Given a national poverty rate of 57.7% in 2002, and with 9.6 million indigents and 
a child poverty rate approaching 75%, Argentina’s spending is small relative to needs. 
According to the World Bank’s reviews (see, for example, World Bank Report 
No: 23710-AR), the program has been successful in achieving a number of goals. First, 
program spending is well targeted to the intended population—poor households with 
children. Second, the program has provided needed services and small infrastructure 
projects in poor communities, with most projects successfully completed and operating. 
Third, the program has increased income of poor households, although it has not pulled 
them above the poverty line (this is not surprising because of the low monthly income 
provided through the program). Hence, the poverty rate in Argentina continued to rise 
during the first months after the implementation of Jefes.  
While beneficiaries report satisfaction with the program, there are reports of 
favoritism and some home-country researchers have criticized its design. One of the most 
surprising results of the program has been the large influx of women into Jefes—in the 
early days of the program, women accounted for over 60% of program participants and 
that has since risen to almost three-quarters. It is suspected that many households have 
chosen to designate the woman as the head so that she could participate in the program 
while the husband attempts to find private-sector work, including work in the 
underground economy. Some consider this to be an undesirable outcome (more below),   5
and it seems to be behind current efforts to “reform” the program. In any case, the 
program is overwhelmingly female, which makes a difference in terms of program 
design, as well as measurement and perception of program success—as we will discuss. 
The program is designed to limit entry to those who had qualified and signed-up 
by May 17, 2002, although some who did not meet that deadline have been added. The 
program was de facto closed for new entrants in May 2003. This resulted in 
discrimination because other potential participants were denied access even though they 
appeared to meet program requirements, but had no recourse for joining the program. 
Further, qualifying households were forced to make a choice concerning who would 
participate in the program; limited entry prevents the program from reducing 
unemployment and poverty rates further. If entry into the program were not restricted to 
one participant per family, it is probable that many poor families would send both 
husband and wife into the program. This would provide a minimum family income of 
300 pesos monthly, lifting some families out of poverty. If the program were broadened 
further, extended beyond heads of households with children, persons with disabilities, or 
pregnant women, participation would almost certainly grow well beyond two million. 
The unemployment rate would fall much further, as would the poverty rate, even as labor 
force participation increases. Further, by limiting the program to the equivalent of half-
time work, workers are prevented from working the number of hours desired, and their 
incomes are reduced to the extent that they are unable to find another part-time job to 
make up the difference. Given that many participants—especially females—have no 
previous formal labor market experience, the likelihood that they will find work outside 
Jefes at anything approaching the minimum wage is quite low. Limiting entry appears to 
have been made a central feature of the program in an attempt to constrain federal 
government spending; however, it has led to much dissatisfaction and some instances of 
favoritism and corruption. 
In the remainder of this section, we look at several of the more conventional (and 
objective) indicators of the effects of the program. In the next section we will examine 
more informal and anecdotal indicators. 
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1. Indigence and Poverty 
Despite the program deficiencies outlined above, Jefes has been successful in reducing 
indigence rates among its participants. Indigence is extreme poverty measured in income 
necessary to purchase the minimum amount of food calories per day. Only four months 
after the implementation of Jefes in April 2002, the indigence rates among participating 
households had fallen by nearly 25% and among individuals by over 18% (Figure 1). As 
noted above, the reduction in poverty has been small, largely because the program 
restricts participation to heads of household and because the income it provides is below 
the official poverty line. 
TABLE 1: Decline in Indigence and Poverty of Jefes Beneficiaries 
  
 






      
Note: All figures refer to data collected through the two supplements to the Ministry of Labor Permanent 
Household Survey, “Evaluación Plan Jefas y Jefes de Hogar Desocupadas/os,” Oct 2002, and “Segunda 








indigence 86.4 61.8 -24.6
poverty 98.3 95.4 -2.9
with Jefes
(Aug 2002)
indigence 87 68.6 -18.4
poverty 98.6 96.7 -1.8





Source: Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Argentina





2. Characteristics of Program Participants 
Program participants come from households with at least one unmet basic need (Figure 
2). These are people who live in overcrowded or otherwise inadequate housing 
conditions, with poor sanitation and very high dependency ratios, as measured by the 
number of family members per employed person in the household. As Figure 2 shows, 
the average dependency ratio in families with Jefes beneficiaries is 3.9 people per 
employed individual. Secondly, Jefes workers are individuals with low educational 
attainment and low income; the vast majority of Jefes beneficiaries have high school 
education or less (Figure 3) and fall primarily in the bottom two income quintiles (Figure 
4). One surprising result, as we already noted, has been the significant influx of women 
into the program, who accounted for 64% of program participants in 2002, and that has 
been slowly rising to 74% in 2005 (Figure 5).  
 
FIGURE 2: Beneficiaries According to Unmet Basic Needs 
 


















More than 3 members per room 21.80%
Inadequate housing 8.60%
Kids that do not go to school 0.90%
Dependency rate 
(number of family members per employed individual in the household)
Household with at least with one unmet basic need  56.80%
Source: Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Argentina
Beneficiaries According to Unmet Basic Needs
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FIGURE 4: Beneficiaries According to Distribution of Personal Income 















































SOURCE: Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Argentina
Jefes Beneficiaries According to Distribution of Personal Income
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FIGURE 5: Beneficiaries by Gender 
























SOURCE: Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, 
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3. Beneficiaries’ Satisfaction with the Program 
The response of the beneficiaries to the Jefes plan has also been positive. As Figure 6 
shows, only a small fraction of Jefes workers have said that they are dissatisfied with the 
program, while 90% are either satisfied or very satisfied with it. When asked how they 
felt when requesting the program, most people (over 70%) reported “respected,” as 
opposed to “undervalued” or “politically used” (Figure 7). Some of the reasons for this 
satisfaction include the opportunity “to do something” and “help the community,” but 
note that the second largest reason for satisfaction that people report is the good 
environment that Jefes jobs provide (Figure 8). It is especially significant that participants 
rate these reasons far above “I have an income.” When asked what they would prefer to 
do as part of Jefes, most people stated that they would like to be involved in training and 
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FIGURE 6: Degree of Satisfaction with the Program 




















































SOURCE: Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Argentina


















SOURCE: Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Argentina  11
FIGURE 8: Reasons for Satisfaction 


















FIGURE 9: What Would You Like to Do As Part of the Program? 
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SOURCE: Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Argentina
What Would You Like to Do as Part of the Program?
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4. Program Activities 
And the program allows them to do just that—help the community. A large number of 
projects are designed specifically to cater to community needs by providing a wide range 
of goods and services. As Figure 10 shows, 87% of Jefes beneficiaries work in 
community projects. These include primarily agricultural microenterprises and various 
social and community services (Figure 11). Some specific examples include cleaning and 
environmental support in the agricultural sector, and improving the sewer systems and 
water drainages. Much of the community work is performed in local community centers, 
thus renovation of existing centers or construction of new ones represent many small 
Jefes infrastructure projects. Examples of community services performed in these centers 
include food kitchens or family attention centers which address domestic violence issues 
or provide temporary shelter and other services to abused women or children. Other 
projects include health promotion programs that offer basic education on sanitary 
issues—how to boil water, for example, or how to handle food and avoid dysentery and 
other infections. Others deal with mending old clothes that have been donated to poor 
communities. A similar program exists for the public libraries, where scrapped books 
from wealthier regions are repaired and cataloged for public libraries in poorer 
communities. Large-scale infrastructure projects, primarily under the jurisdiction of the 
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FIGURE 10: Distribution of Jefes Workers by Type of Employment 
 











































SOURCE: Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Argentina
Micro enterprises (mainly in agriculture) 26
Social and community services 17
Maintenance and cleaning of public spaces 14
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Educational activities 10
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Source: Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security, Argentina
Types of Community Projects  14
5. Other Positive Impacts on Participants  
One of the most distinguishing features of the program’s institutional design is its 
decentralized model of administration. The Argentinean federal government provides the 
funding, general guidelines for the execution of work projects, and some auxiliary 
services for managing the program. Such services include maintaining a national registry 
of program beneficiaries, as well as databases that track all projects that have been 
proposed, approved, denied, and completed. Note that all these databases are publicly 
available, thereby increasing transparency and reducing corruption.
1 The actual 
administration of the program, however, is primarily executed by the municipal 
governments. The municipalities are responsible for assessing the pressing needs and 
available resources of their communities and for evaluating the projects proposed by the 
local nonprofits or NGOs. For those projects that have been approved, the municipality 
contacts program beneficiaries informing them of the availability, time, and place of 
work. As we will discuss below, organization of projects by community activists has 
provided the opportunity to provide a range of additional services to participants, while 
enhancing social cohesion and participation in community life. 
In addition, by remunerating activities that had previously been mostly unpaid 
work, Jefes has helped to broaden the meaning of work. For example, in the past, some 
people have delivered medicine or read newspapers to the elderly on purely voluntary 
basis; now the Jefes program allows for these to be paid activities. Other undertakings 
that may not be in the purview of profit-making enterprises (e.g., environmental cleanup, 
child care, soup kitchens) are also part of these government-funded jobs. The preliminary 
indication is that the projects provide needed service to the community. Furthermore the 
program has enhanced civic participation by involving many people across different 
social strata in the political process. Participants were also required to register their 
children in school and take the necessary vaccinations. These are two added benefits of 
the program design, made possible by simple eligibility criteria. 
 
                                                 
1 For example, the Ministry of Labor collects data on Jefes beneficiaries, which is available monthly and 
lists all workers (by name and registry number) involved in the projects of each municipality.   15
III. SITE VISITS AND INTERVIEWS WITH PARTICIPANTS AND 
SUPERVISORS 
 
In August 2005 we conducted a series of site visits, interviewing program participants 
and supervisors. We make no claim that the projects we examined represent a random 
sample, however, we did visit a range of types of projects. We visited projects that were 
formulated and supervised by community activists, as well as those run by municipal 
governments. We also were able to observe projects whose participants were mostly 
immigrants with little formal labor market experience, as well as projects with skilled 
workers who had lost jobs as a result of the economic crisis. One project employed 
mostly young and educated women from a “downwardly mobile” neighborhood that had 
aspired to middle class status before the crisis. Some of the projects sold output in 
markets, while others distributed their output or services free of charge to their 
communities. We visited projects in both urban and suburban areas surrounding Buenos 
Aires. A large majority of the participants we interviewed were female, as were many of 
the supervisors.  
However, our sample of projects and participants was not representative of the 
program as a whole due to the following limitations: we did not visit projects outside the 
greater Buenos Aires area; there were no rural areas included (and only one quasi-
agricultural project included); male participants were under-represented; and we were not 
able to visit any large-scale enterprises (such as public hospitals) that employ Jefes 
workers. While we had a series of questions to help guide the interviews, we allowed the 
discussion to develop naturally. In some cases, supervisors had gathered together a 
number of participants for the interview; in other cases, we interviewed participants as 
they worked at their usual workplace. Translation was done by Daniel Kostzer (Labor 
Ministry economist who is also a C-FEPS research associate) and Martha Tepepa 
(Columbia University). In addition, Jan Kregel, Chief of Policy Analysis and 
Development, Office of Financing for Development, United Nations, and Distinguished 
Research Professor, UMKC, attended the meetings with government officials.  
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1. Jefes Projects in the Neighborhood of Mataderos 
The first group of job creation projects we visited was in the neighborhood of Mataderos. 
It is among the most impoverished regions in suburban Buenos Aires. The infrastructure 
was crumbling, many streets were not paved, there was limited electrification, houses 
lacked proper windows and roofs (there were many shanty homes), manhole covers were 
missing, and piles of trash littered the streets. In fact, this particular area of Mataderos 
was called Ciudad Oculta—the Hidden City, a city whose destitution, according to the 
locals, nobody wants to see.  
Our guide through the neighborhood was Gladis, a leader of one of the picatero 
political social movements called “Barrios de Pie.” Picateros are generally members of 
political organizations that represent the workers and the poorest of the poor. The 
picateros were among the many individuals who took to the streets during the crisis in 
December 2001–January 2002 and who demanded that the government create jobs and 
deal with the massive poverty problem.
2 Most of these social movements today have 
official representation in the Ministry of Labor so that the interests of the poorest 
segments of the population are directly conveyed to policy makers. In other words, these 
are political or grassroots movements whose representatives have a voice in government. 
Gladis was one such representative.
3 
 
The Butcher Shop 
She first showed us the construction project of a very small two-story building, whose 
first floor was intended as a butcher shop for the unemployed men in the community, and 
whose second floor was to serve as a small training and education facility. This was a 
common model for many projects: one room was allocated to the actual jobs being 
performed, while adjacent rooms were allocated for literacy training or basic education. It 
is worth noting that the initial stages of construction were self-financed. The organizers 
were planning to apply for funds from the government in order to complete the project 
and pay Jefes wages to those who would work there. Such job creation projects generally 
                                                 
2 Picateros participating in the Jefes plan are said to be less than 10% of total participants. 
3 The organization “Barrios de Pie” that Gladis headed is part of a bigger political movement called “Patria 
Libre”—one of the collaborative picatero movements in the country working closely with the government 
to create jobs. Some picatero groups continue to shun collaboration with the government.   17
receive up to 60% to 80% of funds from the national government (see Tcherneva and 
Wray 2005a, 2005b, and 2005c). The rest is financed through nonprofits or NGOs. 
 
The Mataderos Bakery 
Our next stop was a local bakery. Once again, this was a very small structure. There were 
three women at work with one oven. The second floor here also had a training facility 
where the women learned how to maintain cleanliness standards, make the dough, and 
bake goods. Other men and women also came for literacy training at this facility. We 
were greeted by about 25 men and women, members of the “Barrios de Pie” organization, 
each of whom worked or studied at this facility. Almost all the participants were 
immigrants from a number of South American countries (including Bolivia, Peru, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay), although most had been in Argentina since the 1980s or 1990s. 
Most of the women had not previously worked outside the home for pay. We interviewed 
the supervisor and the workers. Each was allowed to work only four hours (as the 
program requirements stipulate) and all of the food that was produced here went to feed 
the community. The workers told us that the food they made was insufficient to feed the 
hungry and, in fact, the poor from neighboring boroughs also came to get food at this 
location. We asked the workers if they would like to work more hours for more pay—for 
example eight hours for double the pay. Each, without exception, said “yes.” We also 
asked whether they would prefer to receive equivalent transfer (“welfare”) payments to 
stay home and each said “no.” When asked why they preferred to work, most mentioned 
that they wanted to contribute to their community and that participation in the program 
had helped them to get to know their neighbors. A few thought that participation would 
enhance their employability, although several of the women mentioned that it would not 
be feasible for them to work outside their community due to family responsibilities. 
There were other food kitchens scattered in the neighborhood. We were told that 
they experienced the same problems—they could not feed everyone who knocked on 
their door.  
Some other services provided to the residents of these neighborhoods included 
shelters for battered women and abused children. Because those who work in the shelters 
also live in the communities they serve, they had a good idea of which women and   18




The next project we visited was a sewing facility. Again, this facility was in a very small 
room that had three sewing machines purchased with government funds. The 
beneficiaries were unemployed heads of household who had lost their textile factory jobs 
during the crisis. They were “skilled labor,” although they were very poor and with little 
formal education (most had not finished secondary school). Two women and one man 
were working there when we visited. The clothes they made were primarily for the 
neighborhood children—mainly school uniforms and gym outfits. The government 
provided the materials and wages for four hours of work. However, the workers were 
allowed to use the machines additional hours if they wanted to produce more clothes. In 
that case, they had to buy the additional materials themselves and find a market for their 
products. This particular group had formed a cooperative (not an unusual arrangement), 
and they marketed the “extra” output and used the proceeds to cover their costs and share 
the profits. Again, we asked them whether they would like to work more hours for more 
pay and all said “yes.” Indeed, these workers were already working far more than the 
required four hours (we arrived in late morning and the workers said they had worked all 
night). Furthermore, all preferred paid work over transfer payments—even at the same 
pay.  
 
2. Jefes Projects in the Municipality of Almirante Brown 
The other set of projects we visited were located in the Municipality of Almirante Brown. 
This neighborhood is an hour and a half drive from downtown Buenos Aires. It is also a 
somewhat “wealthier” neighborhood by comparison. It still had many dirt roads and 
crumbling homes, but it was generally cleaner, there were some small shops and 
businesses in the area, and the neighborhood was a bit safer. The neighborhood was said 
to have been lower-middle class before the crisis.   19
Our guide was Dr. Graciela Doldan—the General Director for Employment for 
this municipality. In contrast to the projects run by the picateros, these projects generally 
offered fewer social services for participants.  
 
The Agro-Cooperative 
The first project we visited was an interesting hybrid of activities. The project was 
located on a plot of land that had been previously abandoned and fallow. The plot was 
assigned to a group of unemployed heads of households to use for their own sustenance 
and provision. The beneficiaries had uprooted the shrubs and the weeds and had divided 
the plot in two parts. One was used for agriculture where men (for the most part) worked 
the land—they primarily planted vegetables to feed themselves and their families. The 
other half of the plot held a bakery. There was an outdoor oven where the women made 
bread and prepared the food (again, mostly for their own consumption). All of these 
people had children and two women were assigned to their care. Thus, part of this half of 
the plot was a kindergarten of sorts. There were a total of 25 people at this agro co-op, the 
men and women working side by side to supply food to the group and to take care of the 
children. As in the case of the bakery in Mataderos, most women had previously been 
outside the formal labor market. Some of the men had lost jobs—in one case, skilled 
work as a printer—in the crisis; one young man was a college student. All wanted more 
paid hours of work and all said they preferred work over transfer payments. 
 
The Pastry Shop/Bakery 
We next visited another bakery, which prepared various pastries. Most of the people 
working there were young women who had graduated from high school not too long ago 
and were unable to find any jobs to support themselves and their children. This bakery 
made bread and pastries that they marketed to the neighbors on a door-to-door basis. It 
also offered courses in various subjects, from sewing and weaving to gardening and 
hairdressing. Again, all people we interviewed wanted full-time work and preferred work 
over transfer payments. One young woman worked part time in another job at a wage 
well below the minimum wage to supplement her Jefes wage; others worked as   20
occasional domestic labor, but could not find sufficient work to patch together a full-time 
equivalent job, even with the Jefes work.  
 
The Multi-Project Facility 
The next facility was among the most interesting. A family with nine children had offered 
some of the rooms in their small home as working areas for Jefes beneficiaries. This 
family was not paid anything (not even “rent”) in return.  
 
The sewing microenterprise   Two of the daughters of the homeowner worked in 
these projects along with the other beneficiaries. One daughter was quite entrepreneurial. 
She and two other women had obtained funding for two sewing machines from the 
government, which they used to make baby clothes and blankets. She explained that she 
saved 10% of her first sale and bought additional materials to make more clothes. She did 
the same with her next earnings and so on. This was a microenterprise for which the 
government funds essentially served as “start-up” money used by the beneficiaries to 
purchase the materials and set up their own shop. This young woman and the other two 
workers also made clothes for the neighborhood and sold them door-to-door. The room 
where they worked had educational posters announcing places where one could get basic 
education in the neighborhood or advice on contraception and family planning. 
 
The toyshop    Another room in this house contained a small workshop that 
produced handicrafts. It contained approximately twenty women (and a few children) 
who sat around a long table where they performed their respective jobs. They primarily 
produced toys. While many of the women had never worked for pay previously, they 
either possessed the necessary skills or learned skills on-the-job. Many of these toys were 
made of recycled or other inexpensive material. As with the products of the other 
projects, many of these toys were distributed to the children in the neighborhood. August 
14
th is the Day of the Child in Argentina. When we visited this toyshop, the workers were 
preparing special surprise gifts for the kids in the area for this holiday. There was yet 
another oven in this toyshop. Some of the women prepared empanadas and various other 
baked goods for the people working there. Some of the women preferred part-time work,   21
although others wanted full-time jobs. All preferred work over transfer payments. When 
asked what they liked best about their job, several women spontaneously answered that 
they enjoyed the social interactions made possible by working together. 
 
The Supermarket 
Many of the products were delivered door to door, but some were sold in markets or even 
at stores. We visited a large supermarket that had a special section designated for Jefes 
products. This section was staffed by members of a small Jefes cooperative. They had 
their own cash register and product displays. They sold products made not only by the 
members of the co-op, but by other Jefes workers as well. This particular location sold 
many knitted clothes, shoes, small crafts, toys, and furniture, including chairs, desks, and 
beds. There was a picture catalog of the many different products one could order that 
were produced by Jefes workers, including kitchen cabinets, wooden staircases, window 
frames—all of quality that did not seem in any way inferior to similar, but mass-
produced, products. A labor ministry official estimated that the products were offered at 
about 20% below comparable market prices. 
We interviewed many of the immediate project supervisors and their 
beneficiaries. The next section will cover some of their responses and will elaborate on 
our observations. The last section concludes with the discussions we had with 
government officials at the Labor Ministry and the City Government of Buenos Aires. 
 
IV. ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS AND NOTEWORTHY FINDINGS 
 
1. Work vs. Leisure  
It is commonly argued that government employment programs create a moral-hazard 
problem. People take comfort in the guarantee of employment and do not put enough 
effort in their work or look for ways to slack on the job. Furthermore, the argument goes, 
people would much rather receive the monetary benefit of this safety-net while staying at 
home instead of being forced to go to work. Finally, a major critique of “job creation” is 
that it will be “make work,” producing nothing of genuine value. While we will discuss   22
this in more detail, the relevant implication for our purposes here is that Jefes workers 
would not be proud of their output. 
Was this the case with Jefes? During our site visits, we spoke with nearly one 
hundred individuals who were Jefes workers. When asked “would you prefer to receive 
the benefit of the Jefes program but stay at home,” every single one, without exception, 
said that they would not want to sit at home and that they preferred to go to work. When 
asked why, the most common responses were that: 1) they felt (or would feel) useless 
sitting at home; 2) they felt like they were helping the community when they were 
working; 3) there is dignity in working; 4) they were meeting their neighbors; and 5) they 
were learning new skills. Note that our findings are consistent with the survey data 
presented above in Figure 5, Figure 6 (which show a high degree of satisfaction), and 
Figure 8, which indicate that participants are highly satisfied with the program because 
they feel that they “can do something,” they “help the community,” or that they “work in 
a good environment,” and they “learn.”  
It is also worth mentioning that while some of the visits were planned in advance, 
others were surprise visits. In all cases, those who were on duty kept working. As we 
interviewed them, we were under the distinct impression that there was work to be done, 
which we were possibly disrupting. We also were able to spend time with many people 
who were off duty, but wanted to talk to us about their experience. In almost all cases, 
people took pride in the things they produced. They treated us to pastries and wanted to 
know how they tasted. They wanted us to see every type of baby outfit they made, touch 
the fabric, comment on the products. The people from the toyshop gave us two 
souvenirs—a Christmas tree ornament and a jewelry box, both of which were made with 
recycled plastic. It is true that there were a few instances in which a worker commented 
that he or she was capable of more “productive” work; in these cases, the worker had 
previously held a job in a skilled occupation (a male who had been a typesetter; a female 
who had been a professional white-collar worker). These cases were few and far between, 
but provided some evidence that satisfaction with the program is inversely related to 
previous employment in formal labor markets in skilled occupations. 
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2. Auxiliary Services and Benefits 
Some of the important advantages of the program that beneficiaries reported were their 
proximity to the jobs and to childcare. Beneficiaries’ children attended daycare (some of 
which was also provided through the Jefes program) or attended school very close to 
home; in a few cases, young children were in the workplace with their mothers, where 
women were designated to help the children with their homework or planned some after-
school activities. Furthermore, many people reported that before being laid off, many of 
the private-sector jobs were in areas of Buenos Aires that required a commute of up to 
two hours in each direction. If their children needed to be picked up from school earlier, 
there was no way to get to them due to the long distance. Thus, many indicated that if 
they were to work, they had to work in the community due to childcare and transportation 
considerations. In some of the projects, organizers provided social services to 
participants—often in a room attached to the workplace. These services included tutoring 
and literacy programs for children and adults, reproductive health services, and 
information about intervention services for drug abuse and violence within the family. 
 
3. Problems Noted 
One main problem with the program that the beneficiaries reported was the lack of a 
pension plan. An elderly male, who worked in the agro co-op discussed above, reported 
that he had been employed for 40 years in a private printing press before he lost his job 
due to automation. He reported that he only had five years to retirement, but after he was 
laid off, he lost both his job and the retirement benefits. He now works in Jefes to feed 
himself, but he was distressed about what to do when he becomes too frail to work the 
land.  
Many workers reported that they would like to receive more training in Jefes, to 
prepare them for higher-paying private-sector work. This finding is consistent with 
survey data reported above in Figure 9, in which nearly 30% of respondents listed 
“training” as their primary motivation for participation in the program—on par with the 
percent that ranked working in a community project as the primary motivation. When we 
asked what type of training they needed, the most common response was “computer 
training.” While we did not pursue this in any detail, this sort of training appeared to be   24
unrealistic for many participants we observed—those with no formal sector experience 
and with only basic education and literacy skills. Yet, even some of the poorest 
immigrant women with the least education mentioned computer training. This might 
merely indicate the degree to which “new economy” hype has penetrated the global 
community. However, there is a real need for increasing the training component. 
Supervisors also conceded that many projects were not providing skills in demand by the 
private formal sector. Although many of the women we interviewed had no interest in 
moving to a private-sector job, others wanted to make that transition. 
 
4. The Meaning of Work  
It was particularly interesting to note that whomever we asked “do you think the 
government can find enough jobs for all of the unemployed?” people interpreted the 
question to be asking about factory or other industry jobs. This led many people to 
answer with a “no.” But when asked differently, “do you think that there are essential 
goods and services that your community needs that can be performed by Jefes workers,” 
everyone, without exception, answered in the affirmative. People distinguished between 
factory work and community work, with many claiming that there are social services that 
are not considered “productive” in the sense of profit-generating activities that, 
nonetheless, needed to be done—things like caring for the young, old, and the frail, 
cleaning and fixing up the neighborhoods, running soup kitchens, and so on. 
The director for the national advancement of employment at the Ministry of 
Labor, Dr. Luis Casillo Marin, argued that, for example, in Argentina there is abundant 
infrastructure for social services that sits underutilized, especially the infrastructure that 
was put in place by the Eva Peron Foundation to help the poor get housing, food, and 
clothes. Scores of buildings, parks, and recreational facilities were created; there were 
numerous residences that the foundation built for elderly persons, abused persons, 
orphans, homeless people, poor and unemployed people, people with disabilities, and 
immigrants. The Eva Peron Foundation also built entire “student cities,” summer camp 
facilities, youth homes for the arts, and sports and recreational facilities. The physical and 
institutional infrastructure that was created by this foundation could be put to use today if 
there were workers. The problem, Dr. Marin insisted, is lack of paid workers to run them.   25
The Eva Peron Foundation was, in many ways, set up to do exactly what Jefes is 
doing today. Many of these facilities were expropriated after the 1955 coup and were 
used for other (mainly military) purposes. But, according to Dr. Marin, many are largely 
underutilized, and it is a pity to leave these resources idle when they were already set up 
to cater precisely to the needs of the people Jefes also aimed to serve—especially since 
Jefes provides the needed paid labor to help to operate the facilities.  
Jefes is helping to redefine the meaning of work, providing paid employment for 
activities that are generally thought to be “unproductive labor.” However, we found 
significant barriers, especially at the highest levels of government, to thinking about such 
types of work as deserving of remuneration. All of the government officials agreed that 
the kinds of services provided by Jefes projects were useful, but they were reluctant to 
view Jefes projects as “efficient.” There was a strong bias toward market evaluation of 
efficiency. For example, officials agreed that the bread provided by Jefes workers to poor 
neighbors was meeting a real need; however, they believed that modern private-sector 
bakeries could meet this need much more “efficiently” with fewer and more skilled 
workers. The Jefes projects that they viewed as “sustainable” were microenterprises that 
could compete in markets.  
 
5. Desire for Transition to Formal Sector Work 
An interesting observation that emerged from our visits was that education and skill level 
was highly linked to satisfaction with the program, and with desire to move out of Jefes 
and into formal sector paid work. The poorest of the poor (generally those with very little 
education) were very happy to work in the community and hold Jefes jobs. Some of those 
with a bit more education wanted private-sector jobs, but had bitter experiences with the 
working conditions of factory jobs. Hence, they would move to the formal sector for paid 
work, but only if working conditions were acceptable. Others with more education, even 
if they liked Jefes and the environment it provided, preferred to get back to the formal 
sector jobs they had lost. 
For example, in the Mataderos sewing cooperative, one of the men complained 
about the conditions in his former factory job. Before the textile factory shut down, he 
was required to meet a daily quota of tailored clothes. If he was unable to do so in eight   26
hours, he had to work overtime with no pay, often till the wee hours of the morning. Now 
he works close to home and, if necessary, stays late (even all night), but only because he 
is remunerated for extra work—extra production is sold and the co-op divides the 
proceeds. Furthermore, he said that he was much happier to be closer to his children. He 
wanted a private-sector job, but only if it offered better conditions than those he had 
previously experienced in private factories. He reported he was happy with the conditions 
in Jefes and would remain until a better offer came along. 
As we indicated, those with few skills and little formal education said they were 
very happy to work in the community food kitchens and agro-projects. This was often 
their first job, and many reported that they liked meeting many of their neighbors and that 
they were no longer just sitting at home wondering what to do with themselves. They 
looked forward to going to the Jefes jobs. Some of those with more education reported 
that, while it was great to work side by side with their neighbors, they looked forward to 
the time when they could get back their factory, administrative, or service jobs. The more 
education and skills they possessed, the more likely participants were to consider their 
private-sector jobs “real work,” even if they performed similar tasks in their Jefes job (as 
was the case in the sewing facility). However, those who started up their own 
microenterprise were very happy to have their own business close to home. 
 
6. Impact on Women 
The differential impact of the program on women was immediately apparent. Many were 
happy to work and preferred being among people to staying at home as they had 
previously done. Many were happy that the daycare centers were close to their jobs and 
that they could see their children during the day. Many said they were surprised by the 
small things they learned which they did not know before—how to disinfect their 
working places/homes, how to prepare food (they learned new recipes), and how to mend 
clothes. All felt that they did useful work for the community and that this experience was 
good for them as well. Many of the elderly in good health were also happy to have the 
option to work if they wanted and if they qualified.  
The “reactivation of women” (a rather misleading terminology indicating 
returning to the labor force—as many of the women we interviewed had never been in   27
the labor force) was an unexpected result of Jefes—creators of the program had presumed 
that most Jefes workers would be male. Some consider it a bad thing that women are 
entering the labor market at all or, at least, presume that women would rather stay at 
home and collect a family allowance. However, all women we interviewed said that they 
preferred to work and receive income rather than receive income while staying at home. 
In other words, while the monetary income was desired, women recognized other benefits 
from participation in Jefes. As mentioned above, the benefits included increased 
probability of obtaining formal work in the private sector, working cooperatively with 
neighbors, contributing to and participating in their community, and learning life skills 
from their coworkers. 
This is important because the Jefes program has recently started moving many 
women off its payrolls and into another government program called Famillias. This latter 
program is designed specifically for unemployed mothers and provides no work option. 
So while the Jefes program used to provide income and jobs to many women, they are 
now moved to a program that provides money, but without the opportunity to work. 
Some politicians and program administrators spoke of this shift as a positive reform to 
the program, while the women we interviewed (we stress again—without exception) 
wanted to work. As we will discuss in more detail below, at least some government 
officials want to continue to reduce female participation in paid work by replacing Jefes 
with “welfare” for the economically “inactive” population and unemployment benefits 
for the economically “active” population. Women who want to work, but who will not 
find appropriate paid work in the formal sector, will be left behind. 
The point is not to require women to work as is done in modern workfare 
programs with punitive means-tested measures, but to give women the opportunity to be 
employed in decent jobs if they want to work. In the United States, one of the results of 
the 1990s welfare-to-work reform is that many women are required to obtain jobs just to 
“prove” they were deserving welfare recipients (even if these jobs require long commutes 
and offer meager wages). Workfare does not guarantee that there will be any jobs 
available. This means that the onus for obtaining and keeping a job falls on participants; 
if a woman is unsuccessful, there is a nearly automatic predilection to blame her for her 
inability to hold a job. On the other hand, the Jefes program in Argentina provides to   28
women both the income and the job. As Hyman Minsky (1986) put it, jobs must be made 
available that “take workers as they are”—that is, that tailor-makes jobs that suit the 
skills and availability of workers. Most of the women we interviewed did not (yet) have 
skills desired by the private sector; further, their geographic location, access to 
transportation, and family responsibilities all made it very difficult for them to find 
formal private-sector employment. Finally, the private-sector demand for labor remains 
depressed; while Argentina is recovering from its financial crisis, workers still face a very 
depressed labor market. Thus, the likelihood is high that many, or even most, women in 
Jefes will not be able to find paid employment if Jefes is discontinued. 
 
7. Formalizing the Informal Sector 
One of the hopes of planners is that Jefes will help to reduce the number of workers in the 
paid, informal sector by bringing more of them into the formal sector. Jefes workers are 
registered with social security numbers. When they find jobs in the formal private sector, 
their employers are required to pay social security and other mandatory taxes and 
benefits. However, not many can find formal private-sector jobs, first because the private 
sector is still in shambles and not hiring in great numbers, second because Jefes workers 
are largely from the low-skilled, low-education segments of the population, and third, (in 
many cases) because of ethnic discrimination. For example, men in the neighborhood of 
Mataderos reported that many of the private-sector jobs they applied for had a “height 
requirement.”  The Mataderos region is highly concentrated with immigrant or local 
indigenous population, which tends to be much shorter than their white Argentinean 
counterparts of European descent. The height requirement was clearly a method of 
“selecting out” the indigenous and immigrant labor. Hence, while Jefes has offered a type 
of formal sector work, it is difficult for a large number of workers to make the transition 
to paid work in the formal private sector. 
It should also be pointed out that many beneficiaries reported that because of the 
very low Jefes wage, they still had to work in the informal sector to support their 
families.
4 Many women cleaned homes (this was now quite irregular work because the 
economic crisis had also affected incomes of the middle classes that had previously 
                                                 
4 The Jefes wage is below the poverty level.   29
provided domestic work for these women), while some of the men worked in 
construction or ran small errands for wealthier people.  
A few people—especially the administrators we spoke with—said that working in 
Jefes stigmatized participants, identifying them as low-income, and perhaps low-skill and 
low-education, workers. Thus, they did not believe that participation in Jefes would 
increase their chances of obtaining paid work in the formal sector. However, female 
participants in the program—especially those with little previous experience with paid 
work—believed that their Jefes work enhanced their employability. It is possible that 
both views are correct, with each applying to a different segment of the population and to 
different occupations. 
Stigmatization could be reduced, and transition to the formal sector employment 
enhanced, through three changes to the program. First, if Jefes employment were made 
available to all rather than restricted to heads of poor families, potential employers could 
not so easily, and correctly, surmise that participants were from poor families. Second, if 
the training component of Jefes were enhanced, participants could be provided with 
documentation of skills learned. In addition, if Jefes participants were allowed to work 
full-time (for commensurately higher income), this would reduce the necessity to work in 
the informal paid sector. This would almost certainly attract more men into the program. 
It would also improve pay and working conditions in both the formal and informal 
sectors—as employers would have to compete with the Jefes program.  
These changes might result in some women leaving the program because the 
longer hours and higher income might allow some men to support their families with only 
one income. However, this could reduce some criticism of the program because 
participation would be somewhat more “voluntary.” On the other hand, even full-time 
work (at 600 pesos per month at current pay) would leave a family with a very low living 
standard if only one member of the household worked in Jefes—so it is possible that 
many families would choose to have two (or more) Jefes workers. More importantly, 
however, we believe that so long as women feel that they reap real benefits form Jefes, 
they should continue to have access to public employment, training, and education, which 
can then be used by those who desire as a springboard to other more attractive private or 
public-sector jobs.    30
V. DISCUSSIONS WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
 
Our meetings with Federal Government officials included interviews with:  
1. Lic.  Daniel  Hernandez—Director  for National Training, Employment, and 
Professional Formation, Ministry of Labor 
2.  Lic. Jorge Costelo Maciel—Director of the National System of Employment, 
Ministry of Labor 
3.  Lic. Gustavo Svarzman—Undersecretary of Production, Tourism, and Sustainable 
Development in the City Government of Buenos Aires 
4.  Dr. Luis Castillo Marin—Director for the National Promotion of Employment, 
Ministry of Labor 
 
Several of the meetings also included some of these policy makers’ staff 
members. All of these meetings were arranged and facilitated by Daniel Kostzer, Director 
of Research and Macroeconomic Coordination at the Ministry of Labor. Mr. Kostzer, as 
mentioned above, was instrumental in championing C-FEPS’s Employer of Last Resort 
model for Argentina, and the Jefes program was created and implemented largely as a 
result of his efforts.  
All administrators and their staff considered Jefes to be a temporary program and 
most believe it needs substantial reform. It should be pointed out that while many of the 
administrators and their staff members were critical of the program, most of them were 
nonetheless committed to it—as an important, albeit temporary, program. Although 
several officials mentioned that the program might be losing political support, Dr. Marin 
emphasized that it still employs a large number of people and therefore he did not foresee 
a program shutdown for at least five years. During our 2005 meeting, other officials had 
told us that the federal government was studying (and apparently considering) a major 
reform to its approach to dealing with poverty and unemployment. 
This reform, which Lic. Hernandez and Lic. Maciel discussed in some detail, 
involves phasing out the job creation component of Jefes and replacing it with a universal 
child allowance and limited-term unemployment insurance. The child allowance is 
clearly a poverty-reducing measure, which, in their opinion, was not necessarily in   31
conflict with the current Jefes arrangement. The unemployment insurance, however, was 
considered to be a more desirable labor market policy than direct job creation. They had 
estimated that if Jefes were phased out, approximately 600,000 people would apply for 
unemployment insurance (which is proposed to pay 300 pesos per month for 12 months 
of unemployment). They had also budgeted the total annual cost for this new program to 
be exactly what Jefes costs today. Today the Jefes plan covers twice as many people 
(about 1,200,000) who are employed at 150 pesos for four hours of work. The reformers 
wanted to pay twice as much money to half the people for not working. Furthermore, 
their proposed program would expel participants after 12 months of unemployment 
insurance, while Jefes is currently open-ended.
 5  
We questioned the political and economic justification for this reform. The 
government officials explained that Jefes was losing political support (we interpreted that 
to mean among the middle class and in the media) and they believed there would be 
support for moving mothers out of Jefes while providing income to their families through 
a child allowance. They also believed there would be support for unemployment 
compensation for those who really wanted to work—and as the economy improved, jobs 
would be created. We pointed out that this proposed reform would leave behind many 
current Jefes participants who want to work, but who do not have a realistic chance at 
obtaining paid formal sector work. While they concurred, this did not change their views 
on the need to replace Jefes. 
 
The Administrators we met reported the following problems with Jefes: 
 
1.  The most common objection government officials made concerned the issue of 
corruption or clientelism. Some of this corruption comes directly from government 
officials. The following example was given: someone runs for office by promising 
access to the Jefes program to his unemployed constituents. He or she is reelected, 
pockets the money, and does not provide the jobs. Other forms of corruption involve 
offering Jefes jobs to people who are not unemployed (this is especially the case in 
                                                 
5 The Jefes reform did, in fact, eventually take place. While the program was still running in 2007, 
government planners have been aggressively moving workers from Jefes to employment training programs 
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the higher-income neighborhoods). For example, a construction company would lay 
off its employees, rehire them as Jefes workers, and subsidize their wage with the 
government funds. While these are isolated cases, they are favorites with the media. 
In some cases, corruption is said to come from the political movements themselves. 
Some picateros are said to use the Jefes money to pay their members to take to the 
streets in demonstration for whatever cause the group favors. We were not able to 
observe any such cases of corruption, but such stories seem to be commonly invoked. 
Even if corruption is significant, it is not clear that the proposed reform would resolve 
such problems—as both the child allowance program, as well as the unemployment 
benefits program, could be manipulated for personal gain. If local politicians are able 
to skim money that is supposed to be paid as Jefes salaries, they may also be able to 
take money that is supposed to go to children or the unemployed. Payments could still 
be made to families conditional on political support and favoritism would still be 
possible. 
 
2.  Another objection was that the training and retraining component of the program was 
far too small; the vast majority of the Jefes participants who manage to find private-
sector jobs are high-skilled, but less than 10% of the Jefes jobs require or provide 
education and training. Thus, the component of the Jefes program that increases 
employability must be enlarged if many Jefes workers are to transition into skilled 
jobs. As we noted above, many program participants agree with this view. However, 
neither a child allowance nor unemployment compensation would resolve problems 
of low skills or education—indeed, Jefes would have to be superior to either of these 
reforms in that respect. 
 
3.  Because the program is not universal, there are allocation problems—some qualifying 
families registered in time, others did not. Furthermore, women enter the Jefes 
program as the head of the household, while the men still (mostly) work in the 
informal sector. Hence, some believe that the women really do not want to work, 
while those who do want to work (men) are not drawn into the formal sector. 
Additionally, there are said to be cases of favoritism—for example, someone who had   33
not signed up for the program in time is still allowed to participate. Paradoxically, 
while the administrators agreed that universalization of the program would eliminate 
many of the allocation and corruption problems, many did not favor universalizing 
Jefes to make it accessible to all unemployed (not just to the heads of households). 
Program cost seemed to be the major objection. We have dealt with budgetary issues 
elsewhere, making the case that once Argentina abandoned the currency board, its 
federal government could “afford” a universal job guarantee (See Tcherneva and 
Wray 2005a, 2005b,2005c). 
 
4.  There are also supposed to be poorly designed or mismanaged projects. The 
administrators pointed out some cases of wasteful use of government funds: for 
example, requesting electric ovens for food-kitchens in areas that lacked 
electrification. Note that the Jefes program generally provides only federal matching 
funds for capital and materials—which should help to reduce this kind of abuse. Still 
it is highly likely that given how fast the Jefes program was implemented, a lot of the 
projects could have been poorly designed and managed. However, there is little doubt 
that at least some of the projects (according to the World Bank’s studies, the majority 
of projects) accomplish what they set out to do, and are supplying real benefits to 
communities that go beyond the wages paid to Jefes participants. If this is true, Jefes 
is superior to the reforms, which do not require recipients to perform any services of 
use to the communities (aside from providing family allowances that allow parents to 
care for their children). 
 
5.  Some administrators expressed the concern that the Jefes workers may be stigmatized 
because they are associated with the militant picateros. But, as noted above (see 
footnote 2), picateros organized only 10% of the Jefes jobs, so if there is indeed such 
a stigmatization, it is a most unfortunate development. Still, there are other kinds of 
stigmatization, as noted above. In comparison with the envisioned reforms, it is 
difficult to see how women with children who move from Jefes to a child allowance 
stipend will be any less stigmatized. It is conceivable that those who move from Jefes 
to unemployment compensation will be less stigmatized because they might be seen   34
as looking for a job. Further, because the unemployment compensation is limited to a 
year, this could be seen as more desirable than long-term participation in Jefes. 
However, it is not clear what the unemployed individuals will do if they do not find 
paid work before their benefits run out—at that point they could become more 
stigmatized than if they had remained in Jefes—and much poorer, also. 
 
6.  Another concern was that there aren’t enough useful activities for people to do. Some 
officials also argued that it is harder to identify useful activities to be performed in the 
big city, while in rural areas the task is much easier. This was an interesting concern 
and wholly contrary to our observations in the field—certainly there was much more 
to be done in the Mataderos neighborhood, and organizers seemed to be able to keep 
their Jefes workers busy doing useful things. Perhaps this perception was linked to the 
administrators’ view that a project was useful only if it was “productive” according to 
market-efficiency criteria. They were more likely to think of the food kitchens, agro 
co-ops, and bakeries as “make work.”  By contrast, it was our distinct impression that 
these projects provided much needed services that the community did not previously 
have and many people’s lives depended on them. So again there was a bias regarding 
what is considered useful and productive—profit-making enterprises are generally 
favored by officials over socially beneficial activities.  
 
7.  Time and time again, administrators questioned whether Argentina possesses the 
necessary institutions, resources, and infrastructure to create and manage these 
projects on the required scale. This again was in stark contrast with our observations. 
People donated their homes so that productive activities could be set up and other 
people could work there. Others built new structures or used old ones to set up their 
job projects. The picateros were committed, resourceful, and competent organizers. 
Even the municipal projects seemed to have committed and skilled organizers who 
made use of donated land, buildings, or floor space in supermarkets. The complaint 
about insufficient resources was also in contrast with Dr. Marin’s opinion that, in fact, 
there was abundant physical and institutional infrastructure that was being 
underutilized. While some of the administrators argued that they had the money but   35
not the capacity to create and supervise the jobs, Dr Marin claimed that the capacity 
was there, but there wasn’t enough political commitment to increase the budget of the 
program to the necessary level. 
 
8.  Because of the distinction between what is considered productive and unproductive, 
there is a big emphasis in Jefes is on creating microenterprises. All administrators 
favored the use of more microenterprises to provide jobs and marketed products. 
They offered some good examples of successful small start-ups (some of which we 
observed)—things like tailor shops or cyber cafes required little money, but proved to 
be market viable and provided income for the entrepreneurs. This offered to the 
administrators a ready measure of program success. The administrators seemed to be 
reluctant to use other criteria to evaluate program outcome. Dr. Marin was perhaps 
the only administrator who argued that we must reorient our thinking and recognize 
socially useful activities as deserving remuneration. Again, we question how a child 
allowance or unemployment compensation can be viewed as more “productive” than 
Jefes, even on conventional criteria. More importantly, alternative measures of 
outcomes are needed to gauge program success. 
 
9.  Dr. Marin pointed out that administrators were increasingly coming to the opinion 
that government should no longer be driven only by the idea of downsizing the public 
sector, but that there was an important role for the government to play in providing 
jobs and social security. It was also being recognized that the government should 
absorb some of the labor by creating more public-sector jobs, including those outside 
Jefes. Some administrators, on the other hand, reported that some of the Jefes workers 
have already replaced public-sector workers, while others suggested that Jefes 
workers did not really replace but actually duplicated the public-sector jobs. In any 
event, it seems that with the new reforms the tide is turning toward less government 
involvement in job creation. 
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10. Another concern was that there were no clear links between Jefes and industry. What 
was necessary was a vision of how Jefes activities can help the overall development 




It should be emphasized again that all of the policy makers we met, despite their critiques 
of the program, seemed very committed to the problems of unemployment and poverty. 
Despite their preference for program reform, in 2005 some were designing a Jefes 
program specifically targeted to youths who either finished high school or dropped out. 
This program would help them stay in school while at the same time would give them an 
opportunity for vocational training on the job. We also note that many of the policy 
makers are committed to developing new training programs or enhancing current 
programs to help move people into formal paid work. Some administrators believe this 
will be more successful at moving the low-skilled women into the formal sector than the 
Jefes program has been. All of this is probably true. What seems to be lacking is an 
appreciation of the contribution that Jefes makes by “taking workers as they are” and 
giving them a chance to work. No amount of training will ensure that everyone who 
wants paid formal sector work will be able to obtain and retain such work. 
There also remains the problem of which activities should be considered as useful 
and productive. All jobs (private or public) are presently evaluated primarily according to 
private sector, free-market efficiency criteria—even though most officials recognized that 
there are other benefits of Jefes projects. Argentina was the poster child of IMF free-
market policies that were largely responsible for the social dislocation we observe today. 
It is clear that free-market ideology still clouds the minds and prevents new ways of 
thinking about how to begin rebuilding a country. There also seems to be a gender bias 
that makes it difficult to see “women’s work” as “productive.” All officials we 
interviewed agreed that the women in Jefes were doing important, even necessary, things; 
however, they were less convinced that these activities should qualify for pay. If the 
women organized into microenterprises to sell products in markets, then the market 
would determine the proper remuneration. However, if products were distributed freely to   37
neighbors, then the work was somehow undeserving of remuneration. Of course, these 
are widely held views all over the world. 
It is now evident that the strong forces within government to “evolve” Jefes 
toward a more traditional approach have won, considering the increased unemployment 
compensation for the “economically active” (mostly male) and family allowances for 
others (mostly women and children) as a means of reducing Jefes payrolls. While 
Argentina probably does need to add both of these to its as-yet inadequate arsenal of 
programs to deal with poverty and unemployment, we believe that Jefes provides 
important benefits that will not be forthcoming from the traditional approach. Our 
impression is that government officials are particularly unaware of, or insensitive to, the 
needs and desires of poor mothers. We did not find a single woman who said she would 
prefer a family allowance over working in Jefes. Yet, most officials (and some 
researchers who are critical of the program) do not consider this to be an important 
issue—they never brought it up in discussion and have made no plans to provide work to 
such women if Jefes is replaced by the more traditional approach—even though they 
recognize that many or even most women in Jefes will not be able to find private-sector 
employment. There is a danger that the current “reform” will mean that many women 
will return to relative isolation within their substandard houses, in communities that are 
themselves isolated from more prosperous society. 
The officials appeared to be reacting to what they believe to be public sentiment 
and political winds—and we had no reason to doubt that their reading is largely correct. 
What had to be done was to publicize the success of Jefes projects, as measured by a 
much wider range of indicators than those used to date, such as numbers of families 
raised above poverty or indigency lines, numbers of projects started and completed, sales 
revenues of microenterprises, number of Jefes workers that have transitioned to formal 
labor markets, and so on. We also need studies that will show how the quality of life has 
improved for women in Jefes through enhanced social networking, improved school 
performance of children, reduction of drug abuse, improved reporting of domestic 
violence and reduction of its incidence, greater access to family planning, products and 
services delivered free of charge to communities, and so on. In earlier drafts of this paper, 
we did not want to sound overly alarmist as we thought the observed popularity of the   38
program among such a large proportion of the population would protect the program, at 
least for several years. However, it is now clear that with the speed of the reforms, the 
program has been seriously eroded because of a lack of understanding of the substantial 
benefits it provides. We still hold the view that the program should have been expanded 
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